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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Although changes in urban space often mean a restructuring of social relations, few studies 
elucidate why network-related frameworks are inherently related to residential outcomes in 
urban neighborhoods. By proposing a relational account of neighborhood governance, we 
investigate outcomes of neighborhood governance by incorporating a series of measures of 
network forms of organization, network-based social capital, and neighborly interactions. Based 
on a collaborative survey project conducted in Guangzhou, we find that neighborhood ties and 
neighborly interactions are positively associated with neighborhood attachment and cohesion, 
whereas uneven power relations between grassroots governments and civic homeowners 
associations are negatively associated with these two measures. These results not only reveal 
new social dynamics in urban space but also lend support to a relational account of neighborhood 
governance. 
 
Keywords: social capital, social networks, network forms of organization, neighborhood 
governance, China 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It has often been questioned whether neighborhood-based networks and interactions remain an 
integral part of social and political life (Harvey, 2010; Wellman, 2005). For scholars imbued with 
a keen sense of space, neighborhoods provide a powerful mobilizing discourse and territory-
based identity for civic engagement, yet social networks in contemporary society have long 
transcended neighborhood barriers such that the link between neighborhoods and urban residents 
has been attenuated in the digital age (Wellman, 2005).  
Social scientists should nevertheless be cautious in de-emphasizing the relevance of 
neighborhoods in sociological and geographical inquiries if their empirical evidence is drawn 
primarily from Western societies. The marriage between sociological imagination and spatial 
consciousness could be unsuccessful if a critical issueneighborhood governanceis not 
considered in the sociological framework of relations. This research thus defines neighborhood 
governance as the control over collective resources rooted in territory-based networks.  Given 
that state-society relations, neighborhood assets, and neighborly interactions may differ in 
nontrivial ways across societies, this relational aspect considers both possession and mobilization 
of collective resources. 
Urban neighborhoods in contemporary China are of paramount importance in building 
territory-based interactions, developing consciousness of property rights, and strengthening the 
identities of middle-class homeowners (Bray, 2006; Fu & Lin, 2013; He & Wu, 2009; Hsing, 
2010; Read, 2003; Wu, 2002; Zhu, Breitung, & Li, 2012). In prereform urban China residential 
space was dominated by work-unit (danwei or workplace
1
) compounds that provided low-rent 
                                                        
1
 Although work unit and workplace are used interchangeably in this article, the former has a specific connotation 
with the state in China while the latter does not.  
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housing to affiliated employees. Since urban-housing, land, and fiscal reforms have severed the 
link between workplace and residence (Fu & Lin, 2013), the demolition of workplace 
compounds and the proliferation of commodity-housing communities have resulted in a 
reorientation of neighborhood-based relations (Read, 2003; Zhu et al., 2012).  
Yet few studies on China’s urban neighborhoods have included concrete measures of 
social capital and networks.  Existing research that focuses on more proximate determinants 
affecting urban neighborhoods (such as transfers of property rights, the development of 
homeowners associations, the introduction of professional property managers, and a 
consolidation of grassroots government agencies) bypasses important social forces in reform-era 
urban China: the shift in interpersonal and organizational relations. We next provide a discussion 
of changing neighborhoods and neighborhood-based relations in reform-era China.  
 
CHINA’S NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNANCE: RESOURCES, NETWORKS, AND 
POLITICS 
 
Urban sociologists have informed us that the city can “increase aggregate rents and trap related 
wealth for those in the right position to benefit” (Logan & Molotch, 2007: 50). Thus the value of 
collective resources and assets is a key factor in explaining variations in urban neighborhoods 
across cities and societies. As massive capital flows entered China’s real estate industry, not only 
did the value of collective property within urban neighborhoods such as gardens, parking lots, 
swimming pools, gyms, and clubhouses grow dramatically over the years but enormous fortunes 
were generated by this collective property. For example, our field research in 2010 documented 
that the amount of parking fees for a neighborhood in Guangzhou consisting of about 2,000 
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households was estimated to be around 300,000 U.S. dollars. Because Chinese neighborhoods 
vary in size from several hundred to over ten thousand households, communal spaces can also 
serve as effective business platforms. A party possessing control over collective property in a 
neighborhood not only charges property management fees from all residents for the maintenance 
and management of collective property but claims substantial profits from outdoor and indoor 
advertising, the installation of cellular radio base stations, neighborhood shops and vendors  and 
other business activities within a neighborhood.  
While this framework of neighborhood governance emphasizes collective resources and 
property (or condominiums) within a neighborhood, private (housing) property owned, possessed, 
or executed by a Chinese household also deserves attention. Since a housing unit of average 
dwelling size costs thirty-three times a household’s annual disposable income (Tomba, 2004), the 
skyrocketing yet still rising housing prices in urban China would greatly discourage residential 
mobility. The much-lower rates of residential mobility in urban China as compared with 
residents in Western countries (Li, 2004) means that Chinese housing consumers seldom move 
from one neighborhood to another to “satisfy their preference for public goods” (Harvey, 2010: 
91). Consequently, urban residents must rely more on existing neighborhood relations instead of 
relocation to avoid long-lasting problems and deepening tensions within a neighborhood.  
Neighborhood governance also involves dynamic interplay among other significant 
players in urban space, such as real estate developers, property management companies, and 
local government agencies. In particular, local governmental agencies continue to interfere in 
neighborhood governance. The socialist provision of urban housing was once regarded as a 
welfare policy, which meant that each workplace was responsible for accommodating their 
employees’ housing needs (Huang, 2003). Urban neighborhoods and residential arrangements 
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were part of welfare provisions to the labor force in the process of production. Multiple waves of 
China’s urban reforms, especially those in 1994 and 1998, broke the linkage between workplaces 
and residence (Fu & Lin, 2013; Huang, 2003), yet it is inaccurate to interpret the severed link 
between the workplace and residency as a retreat from urban space by state power. To the 
contrary, grassroots government agencies such as street offices (jiedaoban) and residents 
committees (juweihui) established in the prereform era have been consolidated to maintain the 
state’s control over urban space. As decentralization and marketization have dispersed and 
created resources beyond the authoritarian order, the Chinese government has found it imperative 
to strengthen their grassroots branches and fill in the vacuum left by the retreat of workplaces in 
urban administration (Wu, 2002). A new institutional identity has emerged, consisting of a 
prescribed territory and de jure population, the participation of professional cadres and 
supportive social workers, and a vertical integration of grassroots state agencies and local 
governments (Bray, 2006). This institutional presence sets China’s model of neighborhood 
governance apart from those adopted by other countries. Assisted by land development and urban 
renewal projects in China, a contentious territorialization process has virtually transferred control 
over territory-based resources and people in China’s urban space from workplaces to grassroots 
government agencies (Hsing, 2010). In this regard, neighborhood governance pertains to 
grassroots state-society interactions. 
The politicization of urban neighborhoods takes place when empowered neighborhood 
entities, such as grassroots government agencies, try to control territory-based personnel and 
resources by maintaining hierarchical authority over urban residents (Fu, 2014; Hsing, 2010). 
Nevertheless, because the exchange of products and services such as property management, 
access to community facilities, and the allocation of collective property in a populous and sizable 
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Chinese neighborhood is “idiosyncratic, complex, and dynamic,” effective social exchanges are 
unlikely to take place under political hierarchy (Powell, 1990: 302). Instead, the failure of 
hierarchical structure in addressing residential needs demands network forms of organization so 
that the shadow of the future (e.g., contentious actions conducted by residents whose property 
rights are impaired) may elicit collaboration and reciprocal exchanges among entities in 
neighborhood governance. In fact, illegitimate or even illegal state intrusion into neighborhood 
property has already become an important source of socialization and mobilization (Read, 2003).  
The association between territory-based social relations and residential outcomes should 
be incorporated into the framework of neighborhood governance. Urban planners have long 
observed that “although people reside, work and play in buildings, their behavior is not 
determined by the buildings, but by the economic, cultural, and social relationships within them” 
(Gans, 1969: 37). Although the prereform Chinese society was once described as an atomized 
society in that individuals lacked opportunities and incentive to extend their weak ties beyond 
their corresponding workplaces, substantial neighborly interactions took place because urban 
residents living within a workplace compound were both neighbors and co-workers. Since 
traditional workplace compounds are increasingly being replaced by (gated) commodity-housing 
neighborhoods that manifest a distinct array of territoriality, neighborly interactions are now 
driven by territory-based identities rather than workplace-based ties.  
Moreover, urban neighborhoods are defined both spatially and socially. Conceptualized 
as communities with spatially confined territories, neighborhoods consist of networks of 
interpersonal ties among residents that “provide sociability, support, information, a sense of 
belonging, and social identity” (Wellman, 2005: 53). Underlying neighborly interactions are then 
the formation of networks, the sharing of information, the exchange of resources and the making 
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of territory-based identities among otherwise atomized residents (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 
1990; Lin, 1982). Since the decline in anonymity and neighborly interactions mutually reinforce 
each other within a neighborhood, the accumulation of network-based social capital, or resources 
embedded in social networks, in turn enhance residential experiences through the exchange of 
information, mutual influence, social prestige, and reinforcement of identities (Lin, 2001).  
We argue that neighborhood perception from the majority of residents instead of other 
entities should be regarded as the most important, if not the sole, outcome of neighborhood 
governance.  By invoking a set of neighborhood perceptions from the perspective of residents, it 
is possible for scholars to establish a subjective yardstick for evaluating the success or failure of 
neighborhood governance. Different from other entities such as property management companies 
or grassroots government agencies that claim their salaries, benefits, or political credentials from 
neighborhoods, residents who invest in their neighborhoods via housing purchases and property 
management fees are fundamental stakeholders in urban neighborhoods. In China this resident-
centered way of determining neighborhood issues such as execution, management, and transfer 
of collective property is also officially recognized, sanctioned, and supported (National People's 
Congress, 2007; The Supreme People's Court, 2009), although relevant laws and regulations are 
often loosely enforced.  
While sociologists emphasize the role of subjective perception in shaping a series of 
individual-level and neighborhood-level outcomes such as mental health, civic engagement, 
residential mobility, and crime, a large volume of literature in urban studies attributes the success 
of neighborhoods to sense of place (belonging) or territory-based identities among residents (e.g., 
Manzo & Perkins, 2006; Martin, 2003). The interdisciplinary emphasis on residents’ perception 
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lends credence to our employment of two measuresneighborhood attachment and social 
cohesionto gauge neighborhood governance. 
Neighborhood attachment refers to positive affective bonds between people and place, 
i.e., the extent to which residents regard their neighborhood as a place to call home (Shumaker & 
Taylor, 1983).  This people-place relationship constitutes a significant domain of neighborhood 
governance, especially for neighborhood mobilization. Place attachment may translate to feelings 
of pride and commitment to the residential area, motivating participation in community efforts 
(Brown, Perkins, & Brown, 2003; Manzo & Perkins, 2006). In contrast, disruptions of place 
attachment by interrupting economic, religious, genealogical, and other emotional bonds 
between people and places can cause feelings of loss and alienation  and evoke collective 
activities to rebuild these relationships (Low, 1992; Perkins, Brown, & Taylor, 1996).  
In this research social cohesion, here defined as community solidarity and mutual trust 
among neighbors, constitutes another domain of neighborhood governance. Sociologists (e.g., 
Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997) regard social cohesion as an integral part of the local 
population’s collective efficacy in solving neighborhood problems or maintaining community 
stability. Empirical studies generally support the idea that social cohesion serves as an important 
informal mechanism through which residents achieve public order and act collectively in pursuit 
of the common good (Browning & Cagney, 2002; Duncan, Duncan, Okut, Strycker, & Hix-Small, 
2003). Given the theoretical emphasis of neighborhood governance on grassroots state-society 
interactions and territory-based networks, we expect that power over residents possessed by 
grassroots state agencies is negatively related to neighborhood attachment and social cohesion, 
whereas neighborhood-based ties and neighborly interactions are positively associated with 
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neighborhood attachment and social cohesion. We next evaluate these hypotheses based on the 
first large-scale survey of neighborhood governance in Guangzhou. 
 
DATA 
 
In this project urban residents were selected using a multistage stratified random sampling 
scheme. In the first stage, three primary sampling unit strata (the inner core area, the inner 
suburb area, and the outer suburb area) were determined by purpose of land use and population 
density. In the second stage, grassroots street offices within each stratum were selected with 
reference to the total number of street offices in each stratum and their spatial distribution in 
Guangzhou. By the end of 2012 the sampling frame of street offices located within the border of 
the outer ring road in Guangzhou consisted of fifty-two, forty-five, and forty-two street offices 
from the inner core area, the inner suburb area, and the outer suburb area, respectively. In the 
third stage, one targeted urban neighborhood and a list of neighboring alternatives were 
determined within a selected street office by a GIS sampling method. If interviewers failed to 
gain access to one-third of the target households due to gatedness, intervention from property 
managers, or the absence of a working homeowners association, an alternative neighborhood was 
selected from the candidate list. In the fourth stage, residents within a neighborhood were 
recruited using an interval sampling based on residential distribution. The total number of 
interviewees per neighborhood was adjusted according to total number of households. Besides 
data collection at the household level, the director, deputy-director, or an active member of a 
corresponding homeowners association was asked to fill in a neighborhood-level questionnaire.
2
 
                                                        
2
 Homeownership per se in urban China only guarantees a seat in a homeowners assembly. A homeowners 
association normally consists of seven to thirteen homeowners, which is equivalent to the board of directors of a 
homeowners association (HOA) in the United States. 
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This multilevel survey design allows the inclusion of network-related measures at both the 
individual and aggregate levels. 
 
VARIABLES 
 
Dependent and independent variables 
Two measures of neighborhood attachment and social cohesion were obtained from 
factor analyses of three and six related questions, respectively. Although China’s urban-housing 
reforms resulted in massive transfers of housing property rights from workplaces to households 
and the rise of middle-class homeowners, existing research shows that most urban residents are 
unaware of their partitioned ownership even though they are now housing consumers instead of 
socialist producers residing in workplace compounds. This impedes civic engagement and 
influences their sense of place. Neighborhood attachment in commodity-housing neighborhoods 
is also strongly associated with access to and evaluation of the built environment (Zhu et al., 
2012). Therefore two variables were generated by factor analyses (principal component factors 
with orthogonal varimax rotation) of two sets of six relevant questions to account for the 
influence of awareness of property rights and the built environment.  
Information pertaining to organizational relations between grassroots government 
agencies and civic territorial organizations (homeowners associations) was retrieved from 
neighborhood-level questionnaires completed by a key member of a homeowners association to 
evaluate whether grassroots government agencies possess power over corresponding 
homeowners associations. A dichotomous variable was coded as one if this member suggested 
the existence of such power relations. For individual-level social network and social capital, 
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network extensity measured the total number of positions accessed by interviewees, using the 
position-generator method.
3
 Network extensity was further divided into that accessed within a 
neighborhood (neighbors) and that accessed outside a neighborhood (e.g., classmates and 
colleagues). Upper reachability denotes the prestige score of the most prestigious occupation 
accessed by a respondent. Three measures were included to indicate neighborly interactions. The 
first is a continuous variable that measures the number of neighbors known by name as reported 
by a respondent, or number of acquaintances. An ordinal variable denotes the frequency of 
neighborly interactions in communal space within one month (response categories were: 1. never; 
2. once a month; 3. once every two weeks; 4. once a week; 5. more than once a week). An 
additional variable was included to denote whether a respondent engages in any community-
based interest group (Putnam, 2000). 
For demographic and geographic characteristics, respondent’s sex (male was coded as 
one), age, marital status (ever married was coded as one), local residence (local household 
registration was coded as one), and status of housing tenure (tenancy, homeownership of 
commodity housing, and homeownership of other types of housing, such as privatized workplace 
housing and affordable housing
4
) were included in this research. Years of schooling, occupational 
category (administration, professional, clerical staff, and service, manual labor, and other jobs), 
and retirement (retired was coded as one) were introduced to account for a resident’s 
socioeconomic status. We also included variables denoting whether the respondent worked in a 
                                                        
3
 The list of occupations is available upon request. 
4
 This paper mainly deals with three types of housing in urban China: (1) Commodity housing is the only type of 
housing readily available on the open market. This expensive type of housing has been newly developed by real 
estate developers, and possesses desirable features such as gated neighborhoods, round-the-clock security systems, 
and gardens. (2) Privatized workplace housing, also known as danwei-reform housing or fang gai fang, are housing 
units previously owned by a workplace and sold to their employees at a heavy discount. Persons outside the 
workplace were ineligible for this type of housing. (3) Affordable housing with governmental subsidies targets low- 
or middle-income urban households.  
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state sector (government agencies, institutes, or state-owned enterprises) or held Communist 
Party membership. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
The descriptive analysis of the sample is shown in Table 1. Over one-half of the respondents 
were female, with an average age of forty-five years old; most were married and local residents. 
In terms of housing tenure, tenants, homeowners of commodity housing, and homeowners of 
other types of housing including privatized workplace housing and affordable housing accounted 
for 21.0 percent, 69.4 percent, and 9.6 percent of the sample, respectively. On average, 
respondents had ten years of schooling. Less than one-third of interviewees were retired. Over 
one-third held administrative, professional, or clerical jobs; the remainder held service, manual, 
or other jobs. About one-fifth of interviewees either worked in state sectors or were Communist 
Party members. 
With regard to network-related measures, about 60 percent of directors of homeowners 
associations reported that corresponding grassroots government agencies hold power over them, 
adjusted by sizes of neighborhoods. The mean number of occupations accessed by each 
respondent was 4.798 (network extensity), of which about one occupation (N=1.068) is accessed 
via neighborhood-based ties. The average value of upper reachability was 72.207, which lies 
between movie stars and officials at business or tax bureaus. In terms of neighborly interactions, 
the mean number of neighbors known by name was around twelve. On average residents 
interacted with their neighbors in communal space at least once a month (mean=2.662), and 14.2 
percent reported that they participated in interest groups.  
14 
 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Results from factor analyses (after rotation) are shown in Table 2. Both the factor of 
awareness of property rights and the factor of evaluation of built environment and communal 
space were associated with large eigenvalues (4.317 and 3.850, respectively). They also 
explained substantial variances in each set of six questions used for factor analyses (72.0 percent 
and 64.2 percent, respectively). In particular, all six questions related to awareness of property 
rights (maintenance fund, the existence of homeowners’ collective revenue, partitioned 
ownership, the use of property management fees, expenditure of collective revenue, and laws and 
regulations) have high factor loadings (above 0.8). Loadings on the factor of evaluation of built 
environment and communal space showed little variation (from 0.745 to 0.836) as well. 
Regarding the dependent variables, most variations in the three questions employed to construct 
neighborhood attachment can also be explained by the factor generated. While this factor 
possesses a fairly large eigenvalue (2.085), factor loadings fluctuated somewhat across the three 
questions (from 0.747 to 0.877). Over one-half of variances in the six questions measuring social 
cohesion can be explained by the factor generated and the corresponding eigenvalue is high 
(3.216), yet factor loadings also fluctuated in the range from 0.631 to 0.807. Finally, factor 
scores were calculated by the -predict- command in Stata, which sums the products of the factor 
score coefficients and the standardized values of the corresponding variables. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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Table 3 shows results from regression analyses of neighborhood attachment. Models 1 to 
4 include differential measures of social network and social capital, while Model 5 considers all 
network-related measures. From Model 1 to Model 3 there is a significantly negative association 
between years of schooling and neighborhood attachment. Across different models, residents 
working in state sectors, reporting positive evaluation of the built environment and communal 
space, or becoming conscious of their property rights tend to have significantly higher 
neighborhood attachment. With regard to effects of network and social capital measures, an 
interesting finding is that residents expressed significantly weaker neighborhood attachment if 
grassroots state agencies possessed power over the corresponding civic homeowners associations, 
as reported by key members of local homeowners associations (Model 1). When Model 2 
included network extensity and upper reachability reported by residents, the former is 
significantly and positively associated with neighborhood attachment but the latter does not 
exhibit a significant effect. Model 3 further divides network extensity into that accessed within a 
neighborhood and that accessed outside a neighborhood. Results from Model 3 show that the 
effect of network extensity on neighborhood attachment is primarily mediated by that accessed 
within a neighborhood. In Model 4 all three measures of neighborly interactions, especially 
number of acquaintances and neighborly interactions in communal space, are significantly 
associated with higher neighborhood attachment. Furthermore, the significant effect of years of 
schooling can be explained by the inclusion of neighborly interaction measures, indicating that, 
probably because of higher opportunity costs of their time, people with higher levels of 
education tend to retreat from public life and thus report significantly lower neighborhood 
attachment (Blakely & Snyder, 1997). These conclusions are not modified when Model 5 
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considers all network-related measures, although the effect of power relations with grassroots 
government becomes marginally significant.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
With regard to social cohesion, an intriguing finding is that uneven power relations also 
significantly reduce social cohesion, which cannot be explained by other variables. Except for 
upper reachability, the effects of other network-related measures on social cohesion were 
significantly positive. The negative effects of homeownership of other types of housing, years of 
schooling, and administrative jobs on social cohesion are virtually explained by the inclusion of 
network-related measures (Models 6 to 10). Residents working in state sectors also reported 
significantly higher levels of social cohesion, possibly because employees from certain state 
sectors (e.g., large-scale SOEs, government agencies, and cultural/educational/technological 
institutes) can stay in the same urban neighborhood, either in the form of traditional workplace 
compounds or newly built gated communities, thus retaining bonded social relations and housing 
subsidies (e.g., Liu, He, & Wu, 2012). Meanwhile, evaluation of the built environment and 
communal space  and consciousness of property rights were still positively associated with social 
cohesion.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
Using a recent survey of urban residents in Guangzhou, we found that network intensity and 
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neighborly interactions (number of acquaintances, neighborly interactions in communal space, 
and participation in interest groups) were significantly and positively associated with 
neighborhood attachment and cohesion, yet political power over corresponding civic 
homeowners associations held by grassroots governments was negatively associated with these 
two outcomes of neighborhood governance. Given that political power over civic homeowners 
associations is at odds with social cohesion and neighborhood attachment, the existence of 
uneven power relations warrants a change in grassroots state-society relations in order for urban 
neighborhoods to prosper. At the microlevel, abundant evidence indicates that both network-
based social capital, especially that accessed within a neighborhood, and neighborly interactions 
contribute to the perception of a cohesive and adhesive neighborhood. By linking micro and 
macro measures of network and social capital, these findings point to the significance of a 
relational account of neighborhood governance.  
China’s great urban transformation provides an opportunity to theorize on and integrate a 
relational account into existing research on neighborhood governance. Since urban 
neighborhoods in Chinese cities encompass increasing social interactions among residents with 
nascent identities, unprecedented interplay between state power and civic discourses, and, more 
importantly, considerable territory-based resources, a relational account of urban governance 
provides deep understanding of the making of social capital, civic participation, and, more 
broadly, civil society. For example, it is illuminating to explore why political power over urban 
residents, which did not appear to hamper residential experience in prereform workplace 
compounds (Zhu et al., 2012), now discourages neighborhood attachment and social cohesion. 
Such change in the effect of political power has occurred in tandem with the coevolution of 
politics and society during China’s urban transformation. Today political power over urban 
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neighborhoods is largely possessed by grassroots government agencies instead of workplaces, 
which had once shared political and economic interests with its employees living in their 
corresponding workplace compounds. The transfer of housing property rights from workplaces 
to households also facilitates bottom-up socialization. Urban residents with rising consciousness 
of property rights demand a say in managing their neighborhoods. This civic element in 
neighborhood engagement was virtually absent in the prereform era when the energies of urban 
residents were directed or coordinated by state corporatist organizations.  
Finally, several aspects of this research deserve attention. First and foremost, net of other 
effects, we discovered significant and strong associations between network-related measures and 
neighborhood perception during China’s urban transformation, which has not been reported 
elsewhere. However, the empirical analyses presented here should not be regarded in their 
essence as causal inference. Second, due to inadequate civic engagement and widespread 
tensions between neighborhood activists and grassroots officials, 603 urban neighborhoods with 
homeowners associations account for only a fraction of the 2,426 urban neighborhoods in 
Guangzhou at the end of 2013. Therefore the inclusion of organizational relations in our analyses 
may result in a sample-selection issue as well. Yet given the rich and consistent evidence 
suggesting the importance of network-related measures in affecting both neighborhood 
attachment and social cohesion, we do not expect major changes in our conclusions even with 
the inclusion of more neighborhoods. Finally, neighborhood governance in China often involves 
the participation of property management companies. While the current research focuses on 
state-society relations during urban transformation, both state-market and market-society 
relations in reform-era China call for further investigation. 
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TABLES & FIGURES 
  
Table 1 Profile of Sampled Subjects (N=1,537) 
 
 Mean Standard deviation 
Male 44.5%  
Age 44.819 15.160 
Married 88.1%  
Local resident 70.5%  
Homeownership   
  Tenants  21.0%  
  Homeowners of commodity housing 69.4%  
  Homeowners of other types of housing 9.6%  
Years of schooling 10.169 2.960 
Occupation   
  Administrative 14.9%  
  Professional 13.7%  
  Clerical staff 6.8%  
  Service, manual labor, etc. 36.9%  
Retired 27.7%  
Working in state sector 20.5%  
Party member 20.8%  
Network-related measures   
  Power relations with grassroots governments 60.1%  
  Network extensity 4.798 4.383 
  Network extensity (within a neighborhood) 1.068 1.614 
  Network extensity (outside a neighborhood) 3.730 3.985 
  Upper reachability 72.207 25.017 
  Number of neighbors known by name 11.523 20.615 
  Neighborly interactions in communal space 2.662 1.661 
  Participation in neighborhood interest groups 14.2%  
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Table 2 Factor Analyses of Awareness of Property Rights and Evaluation of Communal Space 
 
 Eigenvalue Total variance explained Factor loadings 
Independent variables    
Awareness of property rights 4.317 72.0%  
 Familiar with maintenance fund   0.859 
 Familiar with the term of collective revenue   0.885 
 Familiar with partitioned ownership of buildings   0.854 
 Familiar with revenue and expenditures associated 
with property management fees 
  
0.819 
 Familiar with the allocation of revenues from 
homeowners’ collective property 
  
0.822 
 Familiar with laws and regulations related to 
neighborhood governance (such as Regulations on 
Realty Management and Real Right Law) 
  
0.849 
    Response categories: very familiar, somewhat familiar, not too familiar, or not at all familiar 
Evaluation of built environment and communal space 3.850 64.2%  
 Convenience   0.745 
 Sufficiency   0.832 
 Landscape design   0.790 
 Gardening   0.794 
 Comfort   0.806 
 Satisfaction of your needs   0.836 
    Response categories: very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, very bad 
 
Dependent variables    
Neighborhood attachment 2.085 69.5%  
 In general, I feel attached to this neighborhood.   0.871 
 As a living space, I like my neighborhood.   0.877 
 I do not want to move out of this neighborhood.   0.747 
    Response categories: Strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree 
Social cohesion 3.216 53.6%  
 People can get together and solve a neighborhood 
problem collectively. 
  
0.736 
 This is a consolidated neighborhood.   0.804 
 People are willing to help each other in this 
neighborhood 
  
0.807 
 If I am away from home, I can count on my 
neighbors to collect mail, milk, and newspapers. 
  
0.631 
 People in this neighborhood get along with each 
other. 
  
0.699 
 People can be trusted in this neighborhood.   0.701 
    Response categories: Strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree 
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Table 3 Regression Analyses of Neighborhood Attachment and Social Cohesion on Neighborhood-based Networks a 
  Neighborhood Attachment Social Cohesion 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 Coefficien
t 
Coefficien
t 
Coefficien
t 
Coefficien
t 
Coefficien
t 
Coefficien
t 
Coefficien
t 
Coefficien
t 
Coefficien
t 
Coefficien
t 
Male -0.074 -0.076 -0.071 -0.059 -0.052 -0.022 -0.026 -0.022 -0.005 0.000 
Age 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.005 0.004 
Age squared b 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.073 0.075 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.001 
Married -0.139 -0.153 -0.150 -0.167
Ψ
 -0.157
Ψ
 -0.090 -0.106 -0.104 -0.123 -0.112 
Local resident -0.033 -0.027 -0.026 -0.006 -0.010 -0.085 -0.077 -0.076 -0.052 -0.058 
Homeownership (tenants as the reference)           
  Homeowners of commodity housing 0.005 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.013 -0.077 -0.060 -0.067 -0.069 -0.038 
  Homeowners of other types of housing -0.082 -0.070 -0.063 -0.064 -0.050 -0.159* -0.130
Ψ
 -0.125
Ψ
 -0.135
Ψ
 -0.107 
Years of schooling -0.023* -0.026* -0.025* -0.010 -0.010 -0.020
Ψ
 -0.026* -0.025* -0.003 -0.008 
Occupation (service, manual labor, etc. as reference)           
  Administrative -0.100 -0.099 -0.082 -0.074 -0.059 -0.179* -0.174* -0.160* -0.140
Ψ
 -0.124
Ψ
 
  Professional -0.109 -0.097 -0.093 -0.085 -0.082 -0.086 -0.066 -0.062 -0.062 -0.056 
  Clerical staff -0.127 -0.109 -0.095 -0.097 -0.085 -0.126 -0.093 -0.082 -0.105 -0.087 
Retired -0.045 -0.050 -0.052 -0.087 -0.100 0.017 0.011 0.010 -0.046 -0.063 
Working in state sector 0.210** 0.209** 0.205** 0.192** 0.179** 0.221** 0.214** 0.211** 0.204** 0.183** 
Party member 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.050 0.050 -0.092 -0.095 -0.095 -0.094 -0.096 
Evaluation of built environment and communal space 0.351*** 0.352*** 0.348*** 0.326*** 0.324*** 0.256*** 0.258*** 0.255*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 
Awareness of property rights 0.159*** 0.150*** 0.149*** 0.125*** 0.117*** 0.197*** 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.153*** 0.132*** 
Power relations with grassroots governments -0.095*    -0.084
 Ψ
 -0.124*    -0.114* 
Network extensity  0.014* 
 
    0.026***    
Network extensity (within a neighborhood)   0.060***  0.051***   0.063***  0.050** 
Network extensity (outside a neighborhood)   0.006  0.005   0.020**  0.019** 
Upper reachability  -0.001 -0.002  -0.002
Ψ
  -0.001 -0.001  -0.002 
Number of neighbors known by name    0.006*** 0.006***    0.006*** 0.005*** 
Neighborly interactions in the communal space    0.054*** 0.052**    0.075*** 0.073*** 
Participation in neighborhood interest groups    0.174* 0.169*    0.391*** 0.383*** 
Constant 0.084 
 
 
0.061 0.041 -0.203 -0.082 0.148 0.074 0.057 -0.225 -0.100 
R2 (Percentage of total variance explained) 18.5% 18.5% 19.1% 21.2% 22.4% 11.9% 12.4% 12.8% 17.7% 18.9% 
Note:  
a 
Statistical inference is based on robust standard errors.
 
b 
The coefficients have been multiplied by 1000. 
Ψ p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01;*** p<.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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